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My title refers to Poe, or more precisely, to Ralph Waldo Emerson's famous put-down of Poe. William
Dean Howells, to whom we owe the story, remembers it this way:
I answered then truly that I knew them only from Poe's criticisms: cruel and
spiteful things which I should be ashamed of enjoying as I once did.
''Whose criticisms?" asked Emerson.
"Poe's," I said again.
"Oh,' he cried out, after a moment, as if he had retumed from a far search for
my meaning, "you mean the jingle man!" (58)
There are two features of this little story that interest me here. The first concems the way the tag is
created: Emerson has been on a "far search for meaning," he has had to rummage around in his
memory, and what he comes back with is essentially an onomatopoeia, less a meaning-memory than
a sound-memory. Because Poe wrote such jingly poems, it is implied, the very memory of him comes
back as itself jingly. Poe sticks in the memory as one who trades more in musical effects than in
significant poetic meaning. These musical effects are, moreover, regularly deprecated, defended
against. We need only extrapolate from Emerson's phrase and think of the irritating insistence of
advertising jingles to grasp something essential about how Poe's reputation has been compromised
by his jingliness. Harold Bloom has this jingling insistence in mind when he writes that he can think
of no other canonical American writer "at once so inevitable and so dubious" (3). His inevitability, I
would say, is precisely what makes him dubious, and this is because his works do not so much
"endure," as they "retum." Poe's place, we might then say, is less in tradition than in memory, and
what keeps coming up out of memory are effects, affects, certain rhythms, a style of musical artifice.
F. O. Matthiessen's term for this ensemble of stylistic traits-again, a term of disapprobation-was
"factitiousness" (xii).
The other element I would draw attention to is the association-here it is Howells's-with a
kind of shameful pleasure. This association is the most powerful motif in all of Poe criticism-veritably
a reflex. Listen to Daniel Hoffman, writing about "The Bells," surely the jingliest work by the jingle
man: "I had bought that book to own other poems in it-'To Helen' and The Raven' and-I confess
it-The Bells.' At fifteen one is ready, one needs, to be swept away by the sheer tintinnabulation of
a poetry of sound, of incantatory spells, a poetry of hypnagogic trance which will possess one's whole
consciousness with a tomtom and a chime" (48). (So entranced is Hoffman by the "incantatory" side
of Poe represented by the repetitions of "The Bells," that he titles his book, irritatingly but memorably,
Poe Poe Poe Poe Poe Poe Poe). Hoffman defends the adolescent "need" to be "swept away" into a
"poetry of sound"-though is there another kind?-but Henry James is less taken by the puerile in
Poe: he commented that a taste for Poe indicated a "decidedly primitive stage of reflection" (60). And
T.5. Eliot is more censorious still: Poe's intellect, he writes, was that of a "highly gifted young person
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before puberty. The forms which his lively curiosity takes are those in which a pre-adolescent
mentality delights: wonders of nature and of mechanics and of the supematural, cryptograms and
ciphers, puzzles and labyrinths; mechanical chess-players and wild flights of speculation." Eliot
condemns Poe's "eccentricity" and "lack of coherence," commenting that "what is lacking is not brain
power, but that maturity of intellect which comes only with the maturing of the man as a whole, the
development and coordination of his various emotions" (9).
These varied judgments constitute a network that I want to try to think together: on the one
hand, a musico-technics, a "factitiousness" indicative of a straining after effect; on the other, a
judgment of puerility and immaturity, even "primitivism," a judgment which itself is inevitably shaded
by a kind of inadmissible pleasure.
Poe is an anomaly for a certain literary history, and he is anomalous, paradoxically, because
he is obsessed with nomos, with law and system. Poe's fictions and poetry regularly post themselves
at the limit between an inexplicable event or motivation-ignoring the inside-outside distinction, we
will call it an "affection"-and that affection's incorporation into, or capture by, a structure of the most
rigid systematicity: the Raven's traumatic "Nevermore," for example, is carefully installed and
reinstalled in a poetic machine that gives it the meaning it could not otherwise have; similarly, once
we accept the anomalous obsession with the old man's eye, or Egaeus's with Berenice's teeth,
everything follows of accord: "observe how calmly I can tell you the whole story." James's comment
might be more precise than he was often wont to be: to say that a taste for Poe exhibits a "primitive
stage of reflection" is to admit that what fascinates in Poe are the rudimentary maneuvers of mastery,
the first foldings-in of the outside, the elementary fixations into figure of the unfigurable matrix of the
self.
I want to argue that Poe's work is, in this regard, decisively modem. In an essay of some
years ago, Jacques Derrida sketched a genealogy of modem aesthetics by attempting to "9rasp the
unity or invisible harmony" of the two modern concepts of invention: "on the one hand, people invent
stories (fictional or fabulous), and on the other they invent machines, techniques or mechanisms" (32).
What kinds of inventions are Poe's? Apparently what disturbs certain people about Poe's work is the
absorption of the first notion of invention (fabula, fictlo) by the second (tekhne, methodos). This
collapse of fabula into tekhne is presumably what Theodor Adomo has in mind when he calls Poe and
Baudelaire the "first technocrats of art" (193). Poe's text-machines announce a fall into the order of
mechanical reproduction. At the same time, however, a strange affective power clings to these text-
machines-resides in them, emerges out of them-and the singularity of the affective seems out of
piace in the regime of reproducibility erected by the machine Again, what is both bothersome and
memorable about Poe is this conjunction of affect and method, the pathological and the normative.
It is Jean-Prancois Lyotard who, bridging the intellectual traditions of Derrida and Adorno, has
provided the best means to understand the exemplary modernity of Poe's work. "Modernity is not a
historical period," he writes in his collection, The Inhuman, "but a way of shaping a sequence of
moments in such a way that it accepts a high rate of contingency" (68). In this view, modernity is
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essentially characterized by the refinement and expansion of methods of temporal synthesis. In this
regard, the seeking out of the contingent and disruptive--say, through the globalization of a risk-
welcoming capitalist enterprise--is simply one half of a process of cosmic complexification whose
other aspect is the ever-increasing ability to negate, master, anticipate, or otherwise program the
contingent. This process of complexification is not, Lyotard speculates, essentially of the order of
human desire (hence his title, The Inhuman); we can, of course, moralize the ruthlessness of
international capital-expansion-from the times of exploration and colonization to contemporary tele-
marketing-as driven by a naked thirst for profit and power, but Lyotard thinks rather that what is at
stake is the elaboration of the inhuman life of a techno-scientific ideal, the triumph of the concept. his
favored rubric for this is the "Leibnizian monad" that is God-for whom there is no contingency, for
whom past and future are equally present, and hence for whom, paradoxically, there is indeed no
contingent present whatever, no instant presented in its passing, no "event."
It is in the name of the event, of an ethical posture toward the event (or the" Is it happening?"
as he sometimes phrases it), that Lyotard articulates his resistance to techno-scientific modernity. And
the central category through which Lyotard thinks the event is the aesthetic, and specifically the
aesthetics of the sublime and the avant-garde, those experiments with experience aimed at presenting
the unpresentable; aimed less, that is, at representing any thing than in testifying that there is a
beyond of the concept, a beyond of representation, a NOW forever out of reach of capture. But I want
to circle back to Poe again by noting an unease in Lyotard's treatment of the avant-gardes: he wishes
to say that the experiments with form and its dismantling undertaken by avant-gardes in their attempt
to stage an experience of the event can sometimes be confused with mere innovation, confused, that
is, with techno-science's ever-expanding search tor something new to program:
A confusion becomes possible, between what is of interest to information and the
director, and what is the question of the avant-gardes, between what happens-the
new-and the "Is it happening?, the now. [... ] The occurrence, the Ereignis, has
nothing to do with the petit frisson, the cheap thrill, the profitable pathos, that
accompanies an innovation. Hidden in the cynicism of innovation is certainly the
despair that nothing further will happen. But innovating means to behave as though
lots of things happened, and to make them happen. Through innovation, the will
affirms its hegemony over time. It thus conforms to the metaphysics of capital, which
is a technology of time. The innovation 'works'. The question mark of the Is it
happening? stops. With occurrence [however], the will is defeated. The avant-gardist
task remains that of undoing the presumption of the mind with respect to time The
sublime feeling is the name of this privation. (106-107)
Lyotard says that the event, the occurrence, Heidegger's Ereignis, the NOW, has "nothing to
do with the petit frisson, the cheap thrill," though he recognizes that there is the possibility of the
confusion. It seems very unlikely, however, that one could ever definitively distinguish the two. The
confusion is only possible, as Lyotard's analysis itself makes clear, because the avant-gardist and the
"cynically" innovating aesthetic programmer share an historical situation and dilemma. Seeking out
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the new as cheap thrill or profitable pathos, and experimenting with forms to present the unpresentable
NOW are two activities that can only finally be distinguished by a moral judgement: the mere
"inncvator" is "cynical," while the patient avant-gardist is not: The puzzle presented here, let us recall,
is just that presented by Poe: is he an avant-gardist or simply an innovator? A man of genius, fit to
have his every word translated by the great French avant-gardists Baudelaire, Mallarme, Valery; or
something closer to Eliot's jejune lover of ciphers and gizmos?
If our judgment of Poe on this question is not to be dogged by the kind of vexed disavowals
of shameful pleasure I drew attention to earlier, we need to enlarge the analytic framework beyond
simple accounts of human desire or cravenness Oustas Lyotard suggested with respect to the analysis
of the expansion of capital). We need to do this, not because human desire and morality are not
important, but because they are vocabularies or idioms for making sense of-that is to say, for
reducing the complexity of-precisely the psycho-social interactions we are endeavoring to
understand. I propose that we follow up Adorno's friend Walter Benjamin's analysis of modernity as
an environment of "shocks," the encounter with which lies at the basis of a certain unhinging of
experience and memory, the affective and the cognitive. I suggest, in other words, that we retain
Lyotard's focus on the event as what perennially poses the challenge to modernity's temporal
synthesis, but rewrite it as trauma, "the encounter with the real"-as Jacques Lacan calls it-which
is always a missed encounter. For Lacan, the significance of trauma for the psychoanalytic tradition
is that it reveals how human desire in its unconscious foundations operates in a zone that is neither
quite language nor quite reality, neither meaning nor life, but rather the perennial syncopation between
the two, The traumatized individual-repeating incessantly some encounter with the real that must
always be re-missed-does not operate, in other words, in accord with normal understandings of an
adaptive relation between organism and environment: neither pleasure principle, nor reality principle,
seems adequate to explain the nature of the human animal's repetitious cycling and recycling, staging
and restaging, of an initially incomprehensible shock. It is in this sense that we can say that modernity
as trauma can perhaps make visible a drive beyond human morality, beyond the pleasure principle as
well as Lyotard's more instrumentalist motifs of will and cynicism. The "encounter with the real" is at
once beyond active willing (it's motivated by unconscious drives) and beyond everyday descriptions
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of reality: in a telling phrase, Lacan says that "reality is in abeyance, awaiting attention"-"en
souffrance"-in the psychosocial matrix defined by trauma (55-56).
I confess that I am drawn to rewrite Lyotard's reflections around modernity, time, and the event
in terms of trauma also because my subject is Poe, and his SUbject-so often-is trauma. Poe both
thematues and instantiates modernity as trauma, and this is certainly part of his slipperiness. In the
essay I referred to earlier, Derrida uncovers an instability in his pursuit of the "invisible harmony" of
the two orders of invention: "this instability constitutes that very event-let us say, the work-whose
invention disturbs normally, as it were, the norms, the statutes, the rules" (34-35). In this analysis, the
"work" is both a text-event and a text-machine, both the place of contingency and the programmed
neutralization of contingency. Throughout the essay, Derrida troubles this friable border, the margin
between the contingent and the programmatic, between chance and necessity. "Invention," for Derrida,
ultimately names a complex and unstable set of operations around this border, operations he describes
as "disturbing normally ... the norms, the statutes, the rules." The phrase perfectly captures the
"disturbance" created by Poe's work, especially his poems: they seem egregious by being so
excessively programmed, their very obsession with poetic "norms, statutes, rules" renders them
anomalous.
There is no question, for Derrida, of an overturning of the "programmatics of invention," no
naive notion that one can stop operating in accord with "homogeneity itself, the law of the same" (56).
But while there is no overturning, there is also always a "fabulous complication" (59) within that
economy of the same, and he associates this complication with repetition: "The very movement of this
fabulous repetition can, through a merging of chance and necessity, produce the new of an event" (59).
And this event will be, once again, that "normal disturbance of norms" already described: "This move,"
he writes, "consists in defying and exhibiting the precarious structure of its rules, even while respecting
them, and through the mark of respect that it invents" (60). The inassimilable, the contingent, the
aleatory, the new, the "other"-all these only find a home through a paradoxical insistence or
emphasis on the programs that reduce them; only come to be through a defiant exhibition of respect
for the "rules"-in all their precariousness- governing the operations of the economy of the same.




But how, exactly, are we to grasp in concrete terms such a "contingency," according to such
a model? How might we read a text of Poe's, say, as producing such a "fabulous complication" into
the encounter with a traumatic modernity? In order to begin to answer this question, I come back to
Poe's jingliness, and specifically his late poem, "The Bells." We know the precise circumstances
surrounding the composition of "The Bells." Visiting Mary Louise Shew Houghton in Manhattan, Poe
announces "I have to write a poem; I have no feeling, no sentiment, no inspiration," and moreover, "I
so dislike the sound of bells tonight, I cannot write. I have no subject-e--l am exhausted" (1: 429). Mrs
Houghton did not report why Poe thought he had to write a poem, only that she aided him by picking
up a piece of paper, putting a title--"The Bells"- and Poe's name on it, and writing the first lines of
several stanzas, which Poe successively completed, after which labor he promptly went to sleep for
twelve hours.
The poem's inventiveness would seem to consist precisely in the containment of the contingent
and harshly impinging: to return to Derrida's terms, we would have here an example of an invention
in which "the aleatory margin [which it seeks] to integrate remains homogeneous with calculation" (55).
Some irritating bells, madly ringing, or perhaps only ringing irregularly, will be submitted to a poetic
form which will, as it were, ring programmatic changes-both semantic and rhythmic-on this
contingent piece of the real: "the bells, bells, bells, bells, bells, bells, bells." The bells Poe hears at
Mary Louise's are real and intrusive in an initially obstructing way-let us characterize them as an
historically verifiable instance of modernity as shock.
At this point it may be well to remember the poem itself. I reproduce only the fourth and final
movement below.
Hear the tolling of the bells-
Iron bells'
What a world of solemn thought their monody compels!
In the silence of the night
How we shiver with affright
At the melancholy meaning of the tone!
For every sound that tloats
From the rust within their throats
Is a groan.
And the people--ah, the people
They that dwell up in the steeple
All alone,
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And who, tolling, tolling, tolling,
In that muffled monotone,
Feel a glory in so rolling
On the human heart a stone--
They are neither man nor woman-
They are neither brute nor human,
They are Ghouls:-
And their king it is who tolls:-
And he rolls, rolls, rolls, rolls
A Paean from the bells!
And his merry bosom swells
With the Paean of the bells!
And he dances and he yells;
Keeping time, time, time,
In a sort of Runic rhyme,
To the Paean of the bells-
Of the bells:-
Keeping time, time, time,
In a sort of Runic rhyme,
To the throbbing of the bells-
Of the bells, bells, bells-
To the sobbing of the bells-
Keeping time, time, time,
As he knells, knells, knells,
In a happy Runic rhyme,
To the rolling of the bells-
Of the bells, bells, bells-
To the tolling of the bells-
Of the bells, bells, bells, bells,
Bells, bells, bells-
To the moaning and the groaning of the bells. (1: 437-8)
It is difficult to know whether repetition is the method or the theme of this extraordinary poem.
The semantic organization into four parts-moving from the tinkling of the silver bells to the tolling of
the iron bells-certainly conforms to Poe's lugubrious obsessions. But I would remark the accretive,
additive nature of the poem; the repetitions get more insistent and numerous as the poem progresses,
and recycle more rapidly in both smaller and larger units. If we continue to read the poem as a kind
of programming of the contingent and impinging margin, we have to consider some complications to
this notion: either the normalization of the insistent bells is not proceeding that well, since it appears
to get only more necessary as the poem proceeds; or, the programming is going fine, but is less a
troublesome chore than a kind of intense pleasure, to be renewed and extended as long as possible.
It is certainly the case here, as it also is in "The Raven," that the semantic drift of the poem and its
rhythmic energies seem at odds: for as we move toward the darkening close of the funereal "iron
bells," the poem's repetitions become more and more agitated, even ecstatic. That pleasure is being
had here in this ever-escalating battle between the sheerest repetition and its containment in at least
minimal scansions, seems almost inadvertently confessed when, amidst the "sobbing of the bells" of
the final lines we hear of a "happy Runic rhyme." But this pleasure, we can suspect, is of the kind that




We have here, I would argue, an instance of the trauma of modernity, in which an initially
obstructing or impinging shock-here the bells ringing and obstructing Poe's poetic impulse-comes
to feed the very work it seems to obstruct, which work returns repetitiously and compulsively to its
"obstructing occasion." Programming-here the poetic text-compulsively re-programs and iterates
its encounter with its contingent outside; returns to it in order to defend itself against it. But it is likely
that this little allegory of how the trauma of modernity might be legible in a poetic text seems too neat.
If trauma is a useful term of analysis it is not only by virtue of the formal paradoxes it brings to Iight-
the return to and defense against the missed encounter. Trauma also signifies something about that
"outside," something we might want to dignify with the word history. To be sure, there is an historical
level to the story of Poe's composition of "The Bells." Poe's great 20th-century editor, T.O. Mabbott,
in fact, took out a map of lower Manhattan circa 1849 to see which church bells Poe might have heard
from Mary Louise's place on Bond Street (1: 430). But such an approach might seem too empiricist,
"old historicist" to modern critical sensibilities: it would, in any case, divest the bells bothering Poe of
anything remotely "traumatic" But here we might stick to our hunch by introducing a no doubt slippery
distinction between "reality" and "the real," one derived from Lacan's discussion of trauma. In the Four
Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-analysis, Lacan puzzles out the behavior associated with trauma:
his central example concerns the interpretation of a dream reported by Freud at the beginning of the
seventh chapter of The Interpretation of Dreams:
A father had been watching beside his child's sick-bed for days and nights on end.
After the child had died, he went into the next room to lie down, but left the door open
so that he could see from his bedroom into the room in which his child's body was laid
out, with tall candles standing round it. An old man had been engaged to keep watch
over it, and sat beside the body murmuring prayers. After a few hours' sleep that
father had a dream that his child was standing beside his bed, caught him by the arm
and whispered to him reproachfully: 'Father, don't you see I'm burning?' He woke up,
noticed a bright glare of light from the next room, hurried into it and found that the old
watchman had dropped off to sleep and that the wrappings and one of the arms of his
beloved child's dead body had been burned by a lighted candle that had fallen on
them. (547-8)
Freud argues that the father dreams of his son's appearance in order to keep from waking up, to keep
the son alive for a few more moments, as it were. Lacan thinks, on the contrary, that the father wakes
up in order to be released from the trauma at the heart of the dream. The crucial distinction for our
purposes is the status of the outside impingement, what Lacan calls the "accident, the noise, the small
element of reality" (60): the burning candle, the smoke, all that is transpiring in the next room as the
Father sleeps and dreams. This little piece of impinging reality in fact resonates with, re-evokes or
re-lights, the most painful "reality in abeyance" inside the Father's unconscious-namely, the collection
of feelings, motives and ignorances surrounding the son's death, that other, earlier "burning up" of the
son for which the Father will always feel guilty because he could never have anticipated, no matter
how much he tried, its eventuality: the son's death, in its overwhelming traumatic nature, always
arrives out of time, will always have been a "missed encounter." Lacan's reading of the dream
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suggests that trauma involves a kind of temporal resonance between the real and reality: between an
outside that is always missed, that remains forever latent, "in abeyance, awaiting attention, en
souffrance," and the reality which is the object of our representations. The father wakes up in order
to break out of the agonizing resonance set up between the real of the trauma of his son's death and
the reality of what is happening in the next room which, as Lacan remarks, can only be experienced
by the father as a great relief: here at least is something against which one can take steps (59)!
Lacan's interpretation of the dream suggests, then, another dimension of the model of trauma:
namely, the fact that the repetitions involved, the compulsive retum to the missed encounter, can be
understood as involving a species of resonance between reality-the present impingement, the
locatable contingency-and the real, a temporally syncopated reality that lies outside the reach of
conscious representation but not of unconscious memory and desire. Such a model might allow us
to see T. O. Mabbott in the role of the dreaming father, taking up his map of Manhattan as a way of
protecting himself against the traumatic resonance set up in Poe's poem. Historicism's drive for an
adequate representation of reality might be a way to ignore the real in abeyance defended against in
just such representations.
It seems to me not outlandish to suggest that it is to just these issues that "new historicism"
aims to address itself. When new historicism attends to the marginal, the anecdotal, the repressed,
it is trying to be faithful to an older ideal of historicism while also allowing that the "history" that is
recorded in texts is more interesting when it is not represented there, when it cannot be so
represented, when it is repressed or transposed. In other words, new historicism aims to straddle the
distinction between a reality finding representation, and a real in partial resonance with that reality, "in
abeyance, and awaiting attention." New historicism, then, operates with an idea of history and
representation much more in keeping with the model of trauma I've been developing than does
Mabbott. New historicism is thus also likely to think of trauma as less a representable event than a
kind of pervasive condition attending and determining the representation of events. In American
cultural studies at present, the main contender for such an historical trauma is the institution of race
slavery in all its immense effects, and a look at some of this work takes us back to Poe.
In her powerful essay on American literary historv "Playing in the Dark," Toni Morrison claims
at one point that "[n]o early American writer is more important to the concept of American Africanism
than Poe" (32). She makes this claim having just invoked the bizarre conclusion to Poe's only novel,
The Narrative of Arthur Gordon Pym, in which the white characters' terrifying descent to the South
Pole takes them through regions of darkness, and a narrow escape from the fierce black savages on
the Island of TsalaL Here, at the end of their journey, their sole Tsalalian captive, Nu-Nu, dies just
as-and here I quote the conclusion-"we rushed into the embraces of the cataract, where a chasm
threw itself open to receive us. But there arose in our pathway a shrouded human figure, very far
larger than any dweller among men. And the hue of the skin was of the perfect whiteness of the
snow." Morrison takes this moment as paradigmatic for a general relation in American literature
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between the white imagination and the "dark and abiding presence" (46) of Africans; this is why she
can say Poe is central to the concept and argument she is developing. The "shrouded human figure"
is the prime example for Morrison of the "figurations of impenetrable whiteness that surface in
American literature whenever an Africanist presence is engaged." Such figures "clamor. ..for an
attention that would yield the meaning that lies in their positioning, their repetition, and their strong
suggestion of paralysis and incoherence; of impasse and non-sequitur" (33). It is certainly true that
the conclusion of Pym is rather confusing: with an expired Nu-Nu in their boat, Pym and Peters seem
at once to speed up and come to a standstill, since their rush into the "embraces of a cataract" is also
a rush into the obstructing presence of a shrouded white figure. In the most abstract sense, then, the
conclusion to Pym reminds us of the structure of traumatic repetition, as we have seen it in "The
Bells": incessant retum to obstruction and impasse-paralysis in motion.
Morrison's claim about Poe's centrality goes beyond this famous conclusion to Pym, however;
and it would seem to need to, sinee--with the exception of the racist fantasies about Tsalal--there
aren't very many black people in Poe. Perhaps the greatest strength of Morrison's argument, though,
is that African people do not need to be represented as such to be powerfully determining. Like the
unwelcomeness of the son's death, blacks might be seen to operate in the "real" of a text's background
more than in the "reality" of its foreground representations. Indeed, the excision of blacks from
American literature, or their reduction to anecdotal, merely marginal roles-"serviceable" is Morrison's
bitterly apt characterization of standard representation of blacks-can be understood as a species of
defense against the traumatic presence of enslaved Africans everywhere in the culture. Joan Dayan,
in her essay, "Amorous Bondage: Poe, Ladies, and Slaves," has produced a brilliant extension of
Morrison's basic strategy. In an exemplary new historicist maneuver, she asks: "How can we begin
to think about those who have left no written records but were a constant presence, whose existence,
though distorted and erased, informed Poe's unique brand of Gothic narrative in ways that have been
ignored?" (203). She argues that one place to read the "real" of slavery in Poe is in his
representations of the idealized, white woman. This is because the hierarchizing imagination of the
white male understood both slaves and women in terms of possession; both were subject to what Poe
called, in a review dealing precisely with slavery, the "language of affeCtionate appropriation" (182).
The dilemma presented the hierarchizing mind, however, was what Dayan calls the "reversibility of
supremacy," a kind of mutual convertibility between dominant and subordinate most readily dramatized
in the idiom of romantic love favored by Poe. Dayan speaks of Poe's tendency to make "convertible
love and possession" (185, 182). We might remark, in passing, that the way in which, to quote Dayan
once more, "the law of the heart remains inseparable from the fact of property" (191) should not be
imagined to apply only to those more or less precariously perched at the top of the hierarchy.
Morrison's own Beloved can be read as an anatomy of the effects of this linkage on those denied the
power to possess or to love: think of the scene in the middle of the novel in which Stamp Paid
approaches the house in which Sethe, Denver and Beloved have entered into a kind of identity
meltdown of desire, possession, and jealousy: all Stamp can make out from the wash of unearthly
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voices is the word "Mine."
Beloved is of course a Gothic novel in its way: it is about people who are "possessed" in
several ways at once. Morrison faces the "fact of slavery" head on, while Poe deflects it. But both
writers avail themselves of Gothic conventions in order to explore forms of repetition and trauma
brought on by the "language of affectionate appropriation," of what could be called the symbiotic
antagonism between property and affect. For Poe, this antagonism leads to depictions of the kind of
psychic paralysis figured at the close of Pym: "Poe is preoccupied with repeated and varied postures
of enfeeblement, a deliberate weakness that leaves only feeling, an obsession with the heart that links
the white male writer, the white woman of his dreams, and the ungendered, unmentioned black" (189).
Dayan wants to understand Poe's obsessive return to moments of "enfeeblement," when the nominally
entitled author or narrator undergoes a species of dis-possession, as evincing a critical posture towards
his culture's "idiom of power" (Orlando Patterson's phrase, cited by Dayan 198). This may be true,
though I think such a critical posture is not, if I can use this expression, exactly "owned" by Poe. I
want to return to my argument about traumatic repetition in suggesting that what Poe returns to so
regularly is beyond either the pleasure or the reality principles, beyond anything that could be owned
by Poe in a subjectively coherent fashion. What he returns to are dramas of affect-a "weakness that
leaves only feeling" after the collapse or volatilization of the cognitively secured value distinctions
supporting social hierarchies. To return obsessively to such scenes of paralyzed intensity of feeling
and cognitive breakdown suggests that the traumatic "missed encounter" in Poe's work is less a
punctual event that a generalized condition in which a psychosocial structure of distinctions cannot
adequately manage or program the feeling or affect subtending that structure. Affect here would be
associated with an obstacle to meaning, but in the mode of an overdetermination of meaning rather
than its lack. The trauma Poe's work is determined by, I am suggesting, is that of a culture which to
a very great degree requires identity at once to emerge from and become entirely distinct from
affective identification; it is a culture that demands that cognitive and social self-possession emerge
from affectionate dispossession, a culture, in sum, that simultaneously aggrandizes affect and defends
itself furiously against it.
As with modernity and the contingent outside. Poe's obsessive return to states of affective
undoing, then, is undertaken as a paradoxical seeking out of that which must be defended against.
With this in mind, we can return to the story of the composition of "The Bells" and begin to fill in a
more plausible account of the way the ringing of the bells might have triggered an access of
programming. Recall that Mary Louise Shew Houghton had originally provided the first "programming"
of the irritating bells by writing the title "The Bells" and the first lines of several stanzas. If the ringing
bells are part of the contingent outside in need of incorporation and programming, then, the same
might be said of Mary Louise. Indeed, when we recall what Poe said-"I have to write a poem; I have
no feeling, no sentiment, no inspiration"; and "I so dislike the sound of bells tonight, I cannot write.
I have no subject-I am exhausted."-we might begin to suspect that what he calls here "having no
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feeling, no sentiment, no inspiration," is closer to having too much feeling rather than not enough. In
a poem written shortly before to Mary Louise, titled simply "To--", Poe had sketched a scene not so
different from what he experiences in her apartment during the composition of the first drafts of "The
Bells" (the passage is discussed by Dayan as well):
... my spells are broken.
The pen falls powerless from my shivering hand.
With thy dear name as text, though bidden by thee,
I cannot write-I cannot speak or think,
Alas, I cannot feel; for 'tis not feeling,
This standing motionless upon the golden
Threshold of the wide-open gate of dreams,
Gazing, entranced, adown the gorgeous vista,
And thrilling as I see upon the right,
Upon the left, and all the way along
Amid empurpled vapors, far away
To where the prospect terminates-thee only. (1: 407-8)
What interests me here is the combination of a species of compulsion-"I have to write a poem," am
"bidden by thee"-and the way in which the very invitation to poetizing-here the muse-like Mary
Louise, or at least her "name as text"-becomes an obstruction to such compulsion. The state Poe
finds himself in is, as I have suggested, not a lack of feeling but an overwhelming by feeling, a kind
of wildly vibratory paralysis in which the poles of active and passive are entirely confused. Dayan
speaks of a "willed passivity" and of Poe's "feeling summoning dissolution" (186). I would qualify the
state described here-and essentially reproduced in Mary Louise's apartment later-as a state of
"suspension." It is this state which, for Poe, constitutes the traumatic condition which both compels
and undoes his aesthetic strategies of containment and defense. It is this condition, exacerbated by
the obstructing allure of Mary Louise herself, that Poe reproduces on Bond Street, and for which the
ringing of the bells becomes the "small element of reality" seized upon as something to work on, to
represent, much as the burning candle in the next room is awakened to as an at least representable
reality, painful and insistent, to be sure, but preferable to the "real" traumatism that exceeds
representation and consists of a kind of suspended dissolve into contradictory affect.
The bells, then, both in downtown Manhattan, and in the poem we have been given by Mary
Louise Shew Houghton and Poe, are "allegories of affect," standing in not for a traumatic event but
rather for a condition that must always be missed, because it suspends the normativizing
representations it solicits. But such an allegory of affect must necessarily also signify the aesthetic
containment and reduction of such an overwhelming condition: it both signals something profound and
sublime, and does so with an insistence which shadows the sublime with the bathetic: affect can only
be allegorized, and it can only be allegorized-in the conditions of modernity in which Poe works and
in which we still live-as betraying something of what Lyotard called the "petit frisson," the "cheap
thrill." Modernity aggrandizes affect, the sublime, the new, but can only do so in the mode of its
techno-scientific reduction One of the reasons Poe is significant and deprecated, "dubious and
inevitable," is that he displays the way in which aesthetic strategies are part and parcel of such a
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contradictory process. If he is a "technocrat of art," then, what he evokes via his obvious, obsessive,
often meretricious allegorizing of affect is the bad faith we necessarily evince vis-a-vis the aesthetic.
It remains unclear, I would suggest, whether Poe is more unsettling for so relentlessly attempting to
formalize effects, to program affects, or for exhibiting the inevitable failure of such a technocratic
compulsion. The question we'd rather not pose to ourselves is, which is worse?-that the aesthetic
is but one mode of techno-scientific programming, one dedicated especially to handling unregulated
affective states, or that it fails in the end to so handle them?
But I have drifted away from the way Poe handles trauma to the issues with which I began this
talk, namely the trauma Poe may still constitute for us today. I have moved, that is, from how Poe
dealt with some bells to how we deal with his jingliness. I want to conclude by revisiting another jingly
site in Poe, one that has always been for me one of the most effective conjunctions of trauma and
affect. I want to propose that we take the narrator of Poe's late tale "The Cask of Amontillado" as a
figure for Poe himself as obsessive aesthetic programmer. Like many of his pathological narrators,
Montresor prides himself on the method and beauty of his "plot" to revenge himself on Fortunato. And
indeed, it all works very well. He lures Fortunato, drunk, into the catacombs with the promise of some
Amontillado, chains him to the wall and bricks him up. Fortunato is an irritant to be contained, in other
words. For fifty years, Montresor tells us in conclusion, no one has discovered the crime to which he
is now, as it were, confessing.
This confession itself, however, should give us pause. Montresor gives no real indication of
why he feels the need to confess-indeed he stresses early on that the perfect revenge must be
known only by the victim, and undiscovered by everyone else. We also do not know to whom he is
ostensibly telling the story-the interlocutor is characterized only as "You-who know so well the
nature of my soul" (3: 1256). When placed in the series of compulsively confessing narrators we get
in "The Tell-Tale Heart," "The Black Cat," "The Imp of the Perverse," etc., we can see Montresor as
driven by a need to communicate that exceeds-indeed undoes-the perfection of his plot, his
program of extermination. What is the meaning of this? Everything about the tale exhibits the
"convertibility" discussed by Dayan: Fortunato and Montresor are quite obviously doubles of one
another. Fortunato's bad fortune is Montresot's private treasure: each character's name at once
echoes and ironizes the other's. Montresor's family coat of arms drives home the point: "A huge
human foot d'or, in a field of azure; the foot crushes a serpent rampant whose fangs are imbedded in
the heel" (3: 1259) (see Cohen for a thoroughgoing analysis of these motifs). The dialogue throughout
exhibits a species of echoing stychomythia that serves to reinforce the identity of the two characters.
Indeed, as Fortunato begins to awaken to his situation, he begins to yell, hoping apparently to rouse
a third party to come to his aid: Montresor's chilling reply-"I re-echoed, I aided, I surpassed [his
yells] in volume and in strength"(3: 1262)--serves both to emphasize the absoluteness of the doubles'
separation from larger society, and to illustrate how Montresor experiences his identity with Fortunato
in the mode of contest, containment, "surpassing," in his word. This then would seem to be the point:
143
Jonathan Elmer
the tale describes howwhat goes around comes around, how despite Montresor's pathological attempt
to assert a primacy over and against his fellow man, he too will in turn see the tables turned-a
reversal of fortune apparently embodied in the confession.
And yet this seems a lillie too pat, to my mind. One doesn't get the sense that Montresor is,
or even will be, receiving his just deserts. Something more complicated is happening. Recall the
selling: it is the "supreme madness of the carnival season," and Fortunato is in motley: "He had on
a tight-filling parti-striped dress, and his headwas surmounted by the conical cap and bells" (3: 1257).
It is, in other words, a moment of aesthetic play, in which normal social hierarchies are not in force.
It is in this suspended environment that Montresor pursues his rather more serious aesthetic plot. But
he is unable fUlly to contain the aesthetic suspension that enables his domination of Fortunato. The
one moment in the tale when we palpably feel Montresor lying to himself is at the very end, when
Fortunato ceases to respond:
"Fortunato!"
No answer. I called again-
"Fortunato!"
No answer still. I thrust a torch through the remaining aperture and let it fall
within. There came forth in return only a jingling of the bells. My heart grew sick-on
account of the dampness of the catacombs. I hastened to make an end of my labor.
I forced the last stone into its position; I plastered it up. Against the new masonry I
r-erected the old rampart of bones. For the half of a century no mortal has disturbed
them In pace requiescat! (3: 1263)
It is clearly not the "dampness of the catacombs" that makes Montresor's heart grow sick. It is that
Fortunato's "last word"-a mere "jingling of the bells"-is quite simply uncontainable by the furious
encrypting of meaning Montresor pursues. Montresor tells us his story, undoes the perfection of his
plot, in order to return to this moment of the jingling of the bells, return to it to defend himself against
it. The "real" trauma of the jingling of the bells cannot be represented (hence Montresor's desperate
recourse to the representable reality of the dampness of the catacombs). The message of the bells
cannot be cognized, cannot be successfully ordered. The bells allegorize, rather, the suspension of
such ordering, the suspension that makes the inversions of carnival possible, and the convertibility of
Montresor and Fortunato more durable than Montresor's allemptto block that conversion.
For many years I have been returning compulsively to the jingling of the bells, for it is a site
of intense pleasure for me, albeit a pleasure about which I don't know how to feel. Is it an aesthetic
pleasure? Is it a traumatic "pleasure"? Is this pathetic tinkling a "petit frisson," a "cheap thrill," or is
it the testimony of the irrecuperabilty of the new of an event? It is certainly a "normal disturbance of
norms." I can't get it out of my head that it's not, after all, Montresor who figures Poe for us, but rather
Fortunato. I see his unavowable pleasure in the course of events. I can just make out his smiling
teeth in the gloom of the crypt. A tiny shake of the head as we place the last brick in. The jingle man.
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To the Strange Red Earth: Anagogy and Descent
in Flannery 0' Connor's South
Janet Irving
University of Cape Town
I came home to Georgia, my foreign birthplace,
home to the strange red earth, the tall, unbranching pines.
- from 'Homecoming' by Tracy Mishkin
Down there [in the South] a poet is almost as rare as an oboe player, a dry-point etcher or a
metaphysician.
- H. L. Mencken (1919)
Introducing Flannery O'Connor and anagogy
"Literary Witch", "Austere Angel", "Evil-hunter", "Hillbilly Thomist", "Medievalist from
Milledgeville'" - these are some of the more catchy (or tacky) names that Southern-born Flannery
O'Connor has been designated over the years by an assortment of critics, In varying tones of candour
or shades of allusion, they draw attention to O'Connor's distinctive, even disturbing, affinity with the
medieval milieu.
When interrogating Flannery O'Connor's outlook and literary approach, both religion and region
are crucial to consider. Points of meeting, unexpected junctions in her imagination, seem to exist
between her Catholic belief and her 'Southerness', Of course, conspicuous 'synapses exist also.
As James Andreas (1989) and Anthony Di Renzo (1993) astutely suggest, however, it is through an
espousal of medieval perspectives and energies that O'Connor attempts to strengthen the connections
between her outward and inward spheres; to find her place in the world as a writer. She adopts
Joseph Conrad's terms: "to find the terms of [her] appeal" (Mystery and Manners, hereafter MM, 196).
Catholicism is, of course, deeply anchored in Western medieval thought. The American South
as a region, though not linked historically to a medieval past, in an unanticipated sense, shares a
perceptual kinship with medieval existence. "[I]n the South", according to O'Connor, "the general
conception of the whole man is still, in the main, theological" (MM: 44): an understanding of identity
that is decidedly 'medieval'. As a result, she has the "greatest possible advantage" (as a Catholic
writer in the South) because here "belief can still be made believable, even if for the modem mind, it
can't be made admirable" (MM: 203).
Documentation of O'Connor's attention to medieval theology, philosophy and aesthetics is
easily handled from a cursory look at her lectures, letters and book reviews; published in respective
collections, namely: Mystery and Manners (1969), The Habit of Being (1979) and The Presence of
Grace (1983). This paper aims to explore one dimension of Flannery O'Connor's 'medieval vision',
that of anagogy, in which she expresses a particular interest.
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